SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - - The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final
order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
However an appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within
forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for
new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time
to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
(n)
The third paragraph of the above section provides for the effect
of the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the appeal period.
Unlike its counterpart in criminal cases (Section 6, Rule 122),
the above provision does not expressly provide within what time
the movant should take his appeal in case his motion for reconsideration
is denied. More specifically put, does the movant have a fresh
appeal period or does the movant only have the balance of the
appeal period?
Pre-Neypes rule
Prior to Neypes, the hornbook law was that the filing of a motion
for reconsideration of a judgment or final order interrupts the
running of the reglementary period to appeal, i.e., upon receipt
of denial of the motion, the movant would have only the balance
or the remaining period within which to take his appeal. De las
Alas v. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 200; Quelnan v. VHF Philippines,
Inc., G.R. No. 145911, 7 July 2004; Apuyan v. Haldeman, G.R. No.
129980, 20 September 2004.
The pre-Neypes rule may be illustrated by the following hypothetical
problem (assume that all dates are working days): Plaintiff filed
a collection case against the Defendant before the Regional Trial
Court. The plaintiff received on April 1 a decision of the RTC
dismissing his claim for lack of merit. On April 10 the plaintiff
filed a motion for reconsideration. The plaintiff received the
order denying his motion for reconsideration on June 1. Until
when may the plaintiff take his appeal?
Prior to Neypes, the answer would be that the plaintiff could
take his appeal until June 8. When the plaintiff filed his motion
for reconsideration on June 10, he had only 6 days remaining or
until June 16 within which to take his appeal. Under Section 2
of Rule 22, “the day of the act that caused the interruption
shall be excluded in the computation of the period.” Otherwise
put, the day on which the motion for reconsideration was filed
forms part of the remaining period, counted from notice of the
denial thereof. Hence June 10 is excluded from the computation
of the period and added to the remaining 6 days. Thus the plaintiff
has 7 remaining days or until June 8 within which to his appeal.
De las Alas v. Court of Appeals, supra; JOSE Y. FERIA, 1997 RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED 73 (1997).
On the same principle, if the plaintiff had filed his motion for
reconsideration on the last day or on April 16 and he receives
the order denying his motion for reconsideration on June 1, the
plaintiff would have until the next day within which to take his
appeal. Lloren v. De Veyra, 4 SCRA 637 (1962).
The foregoing rule had crystallized into hornbook doctrine as
evidenced by the number of cases which followed it and the comments
of eminent authorities on remedial law. See JOSE Y. FERIA, 1997
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED 73 (1997); 1 FLORENZ D. REGALADO,
REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 192-94 (7th rev. ed., 3rd printing, 1999).
It was applied as recently as the 16 May 2005 case of Fernandez
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131094, just four months prior to
the promulgation of Neypes.
In Fernandez, the petitioner had received a copy of the adverse
decision of the RTC on 28 June 1994. On 12 July 1994 or 14 days
after receipt of the decision, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. The petitioner received a copy of the order denying
his motion for reconsideration on 29 November 1994 and on 9 December
1994 he filed a motion for new trial. The Supreme Court held that
the judgment had become final and unappealable since the petitioner
only had 2 days or until 2 December 1994 (30 November being a
holiday) within which to file a motion for new trial. It should
be remembered that under Section 1 of Rule 38, a motion for new
trial may be filed “[w]ithin the period for taking an appeal.”
Clearly implicit from the ruling therefore is that appeal could
have been taken only until 2 December 1994.
Then on 14 September 2005, like a thunderbolt from a clear sky,
came the en banc decision of the Supreme Court in Neypes v. Court
of Appeals.
Summary of the case
The pertinent facts of Neypes are as follows: The petitioners
filed with the Regional Trial Court an action for annulment of
title and reconveyance against the private respondents. The private
respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription.
The trial court issued an order granting the motion and dismissing
the case. The petitioners received a copy of the dismissal order
on 3 March 1998 and on the 15th day thereafter or on 18 March
1998 they filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court
denied the motion for reconsideration in an order which was received
by petitioners on 22 July 1998. On 27 July 1998, the petitioners
filed with the trial court a notice of appeal. The trial court
denied the notice of appeal stating that petitioners only had
up to 23 July 1998 within which to file the notice of appeal.
The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil
action for certiorari and mandamus assailing the trial court’s
dismissal order. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
Hence the petitioners went to the Supreme Court on a petition
for review on certiorari.
The issue was whether the petitioners’ notice of appeal
was filed on time.
The Supreme Court held that the notice of appeal was filed in
due time. It cited Section 1, Rule 41, which states that “[a]n
appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order.” The
high court held that an order denying a motion for reconsideration
is a final order as it finally disposes of the case, leaving nothing
more for the court to do with respect to it.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice
of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July
22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with
Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall
be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or”
signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another.
It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision
supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days
from the notice of the “final order,” which we already
determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion
for new trial or reconsideration.
Thus in respect of the hypothetical problem earlier given, and
taking into account the Neypes ruling, the answer would be June
16 and not June 8.
The Supreme Court invoked its plenary power to “[p]romulgate
rules concerning … pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts” in laying down the “fresh period rule.”
The high court cited the need to standardize the various appeal
periods and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases. The Supreme Court also held that henceforth the “fresh
period rule” applies not only to Rule 41 but also to Rule
40 (appeal from MTC to RTC), Rule 42 (petition for review from
RTC to CA), Rule 43 (appeal from quasi-judicial bodies to the
CA), and Rule 45 (appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and
to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the
Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply
to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to
the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from
the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and
Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform,
to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for
new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial)
or any final order or resolution.
The Neypes statement that the “fresh period rule”
would henceforth apply not only to Rules 40 and 41 but also to
Rules 42, 43, and 45 is not altogether precise. Even prior to
and independently of Neypes, specific provisions in Rule 42 (Section
1), Rule 43 (Section 4), and Rule 45 (Section 2) already provided
that the 15-day period is computed from the receipt of the judgment
or final order or from receipt of the order denying the motion
for reconsideration. Hence Neypes brought nothing to the table
in respect of Rules 42, 43, and 45.
Critical analysis
The holding in Neypes flies in the face of the explicit provisions
of Section 1(a), Rule 41, which states that no appeal may be taken
from an order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration,
and Section 9, Rule 37 which provides that “[a]n order denying
a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the
remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order.”
Section 3 of Rule 41 in lucid terms provides for the effect of
a motion for reconsideration: “The period of appeal shall
be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.”
The word “interrupt” means to “break the continuity
of.” Oxford American Dictionary (1980). It is synonymous
with “suspend” which means “to discontinue temporarily,
but with an expectation or purpose of resumption.” Black’s
Law Dictionary (Abridged 5th ed., 1983). As the word is used in
the Rules of Court provisions on appeal, it means the same as
to “toll,” or to “suspend.” This is discernible
from Section 2 of Rule 22.
SEC. 2. Effect of interruption. - - Should an act be done which
effectively interrupts the running of the period, the allowable
period after such interruption shall start to run on the day after
notice of the cessation of the cause thereof.
The day of the act that caused the interruption shall be excluded.
(n)
It is also evident from a reading of Section 3 of Rule 41, in
conjunction with Section 1(a) of Rule 41 and Section 9 of Rule
37, that the filing of the motion for reconsideration does not
obliterate the appeal period which had already lapsed but merely
discontinues its running. Hence upon the receipt of the order
denying the motion for reconsideration, the movant only has the
balance or the remaining period.
The Neypes holding cannot be reconciled with Sections 1(a) and
3 of Rule 41 and Section 9 of Rule 37. There is thus a cogent
need for the amendment of these provisions in order to bring them
in line with the Neypes ruling and avoid confusion and misapprehension.
Inconsistency with Section 6, Rule 122
The Neypes ruling also results in a lack of harmony or inconsistency
between the pertinent rule in civil cases and criminal cases.
Under Section 6 of Rule 122 providing for the rule in ordinary
appeal in criminal cases, an accused who files a motion for reconsideration
of a judgment in a criminal case which is later denied only has
the balance of the period within which to take his appeal.
SEC. 6. When appeal taken. – An appeal must be taken within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice
of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an
appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial
or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling
the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at
which time the balance of the period begins to run. (6a)
The Neypes rule has led to a somewhat anomalous situation wherein
a defendant in a civil case has a better right of appeal than
the accused in a criminal case.
Justice Jose Sabio in his work on Criminal Procedure opined
that the rule in Neypes should also be applied to criminal cases.
Neypes however did not expressly extend its application to Rule
122. In the absence of a definite pronouncement from the Supreme
Court, it would appear that a trial judge has no choice but to
apply the clear provisions of Section 6 of Rule 122.
Applicability to appeals requiring a record on appeal
While Neypes provided for a “fresh” 15-day rule,
it is not altogether clear if a “fresh” 30-day period
is also provided for in appeals where a record on appeal is required.
It is submitted that the ruling should also be extended to such
cases. There appears to be no valid reason to distinguish between
an appeal taken by mere notice of appeal from one taken by a record
on appeal. In fact the reason for the Neypes ruling would find
greater force considering the difficulty and greater time needed
in preparing a record on appeal.
Outline of application of Neypes rule
In light of the Neypes, the rules regarding its application
may be outlined below:
The following are the instances where the Neypes rule applies:
1. Rule 40.
2. Rule 41.
3. Rule 42.
4. Rule 43.
5. Rule 45.
On the other hand, the following cases are not covered by the
Neypes rule:
1. Rule 122, Section 6, on ordinary appeal in criminal cases.
However, if the appeal would be under Rules 42, 43, and 45, the
Neypes rule would apply.
2. Rule 64, Section 3. In a petition to review the judgment of
the COMELEC or the COA, the petitioner has 30 days from receipt
of the judgment or final order to file the petition for review.
If a motion for reconsideration has been filed and denied, the
movant has only the remaining period but not less than 5 days
within which to file the petition.
Proposals/Proposed amendments to the Rules
The writer humbly proposes the following modifications or amendments
to the Rules of Court. This is in line with the avowed purpose
of Neypes to standardize the appeal periods and afford litigants
fair opportunity to appeal their cases. Further, the amendments
would also avoid any misapprehension or confusion on the part
of litigants and lawyers.
First. Section 2, Rule 40, and Section 3, Rule 41, should be
amended to make it clear that the appeal period is counted from
the receipt of the judgment or final order or of the order denying
the motion for reconsideration, if one was filed.
Second. Section 6 of Rule 122 should be similarly amended. This
will synchronize the rule on appeal in civil and criminal cases
and avoid the somewhat unfair situation of an accused in a criminal
case having a lesser period to appeal than a defendant in a civil
case. Section 3 of Rule 64 should also be amended in like manner.
This will harmonize Rule 64 with Rule 65, which after all are
both considered as special civil actions for certiorari under
the Rules.
Finally Section 9 of Rule 37 and Section 1(a) of Rule 41 should
be deleted. The two provisions have become obsolete in the light
of the “fresh period rule” laid down in Neypes.
-oOo-
All rights reserved 2007. Manuel R. Riguera
